Association Between Borrower and Lender State Ownership and Accounting Conservatism by Chen, Hanwen et al.
DOI: 10.1111/j.1475-679X.2010.00385.x
Journal of Accounting Research
Vol. 48 No. 5 December 2010
Printed in U.S.A.
Association Between Borrower
and Lender State Ownership
and Accounting Conservatism
H A N W E N C H E N , ∗ J E F F Z E Y U N C H E N , † G E R A L D J . L O B O , ‡
A N D Y A N Y A N W A N G ∗
Received 11 November 2009; accepted 06 July 2010
ABSTRACT
We examine the association between borrower (firm) and lender (bank) state
ownership and accounting conservatism for a sample of Chinese firms. We
hypothesize that state-owned enterprises (SOEs) adopt less conservative ac-
counting than non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs) because lenders are less
concerned with downside risk for SOEs than for NSOEs. We also hypothe-
size a negative relation between conservatism and the fraction of total loans
a firm borrows from state-owned banks (SBs) because SBs have weaker de-
mand for assurance of sufficient net assets to cover loan repayments than
non-state-owned banks (NSBs). We find support for both hypotheses. Further
analyses reveal that: (1) firms that borrow from commercial SBs exhibit more
conservative accounting than firms that borrow from policy SBs and (2) firms
adopt more conservative accounting as they get more loans from banks with
foreign ownership or exclusively foreign banks. However, the results of these
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additional analyses are to some extent sensitive to alternative measures of ac-
counting conservatism.
1. Introduction
A major source of demand for accounting conservatism arises from
lenders’ concern about borrowers’ default risk. Watts [2003] reasons that
conservative accounting is an efficient debt contracting technology to ad-
dress agency problems caused by lenders having asymmetric information
and asymmetric payoffs. Given that lenders bear downside risk, they de-
mand assurance that the minimum amount of net assets will be sufficient
to repay the contracted sum. Conservative accounting effectively satisfies
this demand because it results in timelier downward revisions of earnings
and book value of net assets, which lead to timelier violation of financial
covenants. Conservative accounting prevents wealth expropriation and pro-
tects lenders by more quickly transferring important decision rights from
loss-making firms to lenders (Ball et al. [2008], Kothari et al. [2009]).
In this paper, we examine the relations between borrower (firm) and
lender (bank) ownership type and accounting conservatism. We consider
two types of ownership: state ownership, where the government is the ul-
timate controlling shareholder, and nonstate ownership, where private cit-
izens are the ultimate controlling shareholders. We develop and test hy-
potheses on how accounting conservatism relates to borrower and lender
state ownership.
Our analysis focuses on a sample of Chinese borrowers and lenders. De-
spite a fast-growing stock market, Chinese firms still overwhelmingly rely
on banks to finance their capital needs. During 2001–2006, Chinese listed
firms obtained RMB (i.e., the Chinese currency Renminbi) 12.5 trillion in
new loans from banks, almost 20 times the amount raised from the stock
market (China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook [2007]). Ball et al.
[2008] find that accounting conservatism increases in the importance of
the debt market, but not the equity market, and conclude that the debt
market is the primary source of the demand for accounting conservatism.
Given the dominant role of the banking industry in China’s financial sec-
tor, we expect accounting conservatism in Chinese firms to be heavily influ-
enced by banks. In addition to the major role played by banks in China’s
economy, there is evident heterogeneity in ownership type across both par-
ties to the debt contracting arrangement that results in differential demand
for accounting conservatism.
There are two distinct groups of Chinese firms: state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and non-state-owned enterprises (NSOEs). In addition to creating
shareholder wealth, SOEs serve as the government’s tool for achieving po-
litical and social objectives. Consequently, they are politically favored and
can look to the government for additional funding should they run into
financial trouble. The government’s implicit insurance considerably alle-
viates lenders’ concern with SOE default risk. Furthermore, the Chinese
government’s reputation for strong commitment to the SOE privatization
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program and its purposeful selection of better performing SOEs to priva-
tize are also likely to ensure lower SOE default risk.
There are also two major types of loan providers in China: state-owned
banks (SBs) and non-state-owned banks (NSBs). These banks differ in their
objective functions, governance structures, and bank-firm relationships.
SBs are often less concerned with and less effective at monitoring borrow-
ers’ default risk than their NSB counterparts.
We hypothesize that SOEs adopt less conservative accounting than
NSOEs because lenders are less concerned with downside risk for SOEs
than for NSOEs. We also hypothesize a negative relation between conser-
vatism and the fraction of total loans a firm borrows from SBs because SBs
have weaker demand for assurance of sufficient net assets to cover loan re-
payments than NSBs. Two important premises underlie our hypotheses: (1)
accounting-based covenants are adopted in loan contracts in China and (2)
Chinese courts enforce lenders’ contractual rights in the event of default.
If either one of these premises does not hold in China, it is unlikely that
accounting conservatism will manifest as an efficient debt contracting tech-
nology. We verify the validity of these premises by studying 20 representative
loan agreements between our sample firms and their lenders. We find that
each of these contracts contains debt covenants based on accounting num-
bers. In addition, we identify 1,269 loan-related lawsuits or claims against
listed firms during our sample period, indicating that lenders can resort to
the courts as a means of enforcing their contractual rights.
We first study the relation between borrower state ownership and ac-
counting conservatism. Using Ball and Shivakumar’s [2005, 2006] accruals-
based measure, we find that NSOEs recognize unrealized losses through
accruals more quickly than SOEs. Next, we focus on the relation between
lender state ownership and accounting conservatism. We hand collect in-
formation on the sources of bank loans disclosed in firms’ annual finan-
cial reports. We use the percentage of loans from SBs as a measure of the
aggregate impact of the lender’s state ownership on the borrower’s finan-
cial reporting. We show that firms adopt less conservative accounting as
the fraction of total loans obtained from SBs increases. These results are
not qualitatively affected when we use Basu’s [1997] differential timeliness
measure of accounting conservatism and a time-series test of timeliness of
loss recognition.
We further partition SBs into policy SBs and commercial SBs to examine
whether their loan clients exhibit differential levels of accounting conser-
vatism. Policy SBs base their loan granting decisions primarily on govern-
ment direction and public social benefits, whereas commercial SBs place a
relatively larger weight on economic profits and loan default risks. We ob-
serve that accounting conservatism decreases with the fraction of borrow-
ing from both types of SBs and, more importantly, borrowers from policy
SBs exhibit lower conservatism than borrowers from commercial SBs. How-
ever, we do not observe such a difference when we perform a time-series
test of timeliness of loss recognition.
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Lin and Zhang [2009] find that Chinese foreign joint equity and ex-
clusively foreign banks exhibit better long-term performance on average
than domestic banks. We therefore also analyze the association between the
lender’s foreign ownership and the borrower’s accounting conservatism.
We find that borrowers adopt more conservative accounting as they get
more loans from banks with foreign ownership or exclusively foreign banks
when we use Ball and Shivakumar’s [2005, 2006] accruals-based measure.
However, this result does not hold under the two alternative measures of
accounting conservatism. In addition, we cannot rule out the alternative
explanation that the government sells the equity of better banks to attract
foreign investors, which demand more conservative accounting regardless
of the foreign ownership.
We perform a battery of sensitivity tests to assess the robustness of our
findings. Prior literature finds that size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio
are likely to impact accounting conservatism (LaFond and Roychowdhury
[2008], Khan and Watts [2009]). We control for these factors in our re-
gression analyses and find qualitatively similar results. Additionally, we find
that the significant relations between firm and bank state ownership and ac-
counting conservatism persist after controlling for differences in operating
performance, ultimate shareholder ownership, and industry composition.
We also provide evidence on how NSOEs implement accounting conser-
vatism, by examining a menu of individual accrual accounts. We find that
SOEs accrue unrealized losses through these accounts in a less timely man-
ner than NSOEs in bad-news years but not in good-news years.
Our study contributes to the literature in several ways. First, prior studies
typically focus on the association between borrower differences and lender
demand for accounting conservatism (e.g., Ahmed et al. [2002]). Our study
adds to the literature by examining how characteristics of lenders relate to
accounting conservatism. By focusing our analysis on the Chinese setting,
we not only are able to enhance the power of the research design, we also
are able to study the demand for accounting conservatism from both par-
ties to the debt contracting arrangement.
Second, ours is the first study to examine the relations between firm and
bank state ownership and accounting conservatism. The economics and
finance literatures typically focus on the relation between state ownership
and firm (or bank) performance or efficiency (see, e.g., Boardman and Vin-
ing [1989], Megginson et al. [1994], Dewenter and Malatesta [2001], Bonin
et al. [2005], Jia [2009], among others). The accounting literature has ex-
amined how state ownership relates to auditor choice (Wang et al. [2008])
and audit quality (Chen, Chen, Lobo, and Wang [2010]). We provide ev-
idence on the association between state ownership and conservatism—an
important feature of accounting practice.
Third, our study sheds light on the lending behavior of Chinese banks.
Jia [2009] shows that lending by banks with full state ownership is less pru-
dent than lending by banks with partially privatized state ownership. His
measures of bank prudence are bank excess reserves ratio, loan-to-asset
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FIG. 1.—Comparison of annual amounts of capital raised from the stock market and from
banks in China (2001–2006). Data source: China Securities and Futures Statistical Yearbook [2007].
ratio and deposit-to-loan ratio. We address this question from a different
perspective, that is, how banks protect themselves by shaping borrowers’
conservatism in financial reporting. All Chinese banks utilize financial in-
formation when they evaluate client loan applications and monitor their
clients after the loans are issued (Hu et al. [2007]). However, we find that,
compared to commercial SBs, policy SBs appear to have weaker demand
for their clients’ timely recognition of unrealized losses. Our study, to a
large extent, provides additional and more direct evidence in support of
Jia [2009].
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We describe the institu-
tional background in section 2, which focuses on the salient features of the
reforms of China’s banking industry and SOEs. We develop the hypotheses
in section 3 and present the research design in section 4. We describe the
sample selection in section 5 and discuss the results of the main test and
tests of alternative explanations in section 6 and section 7, respectively. We
report the results of additional tests in section 8 and present our conclu-
sions in section 9.
2. Institutional Background
2.1 REFORM OF CHINA’S BANKING INDUSTRY
The banking industry plays a dominant role in China’s financial sector.
Despite the significant growth of the equity market, firms still overwhelm-
ingly rely on banks to satisfy their capital needs. Figure 1 shows that capital
raised from banks each year ranges from RMB 1,250 to RMB 3,100 billion
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during 2001–2006, whereas capital raised from the stock market during this
period is only between RMB 30 and RMB 250 billion a year.
China’s banking industry has undergone significant reform since the late
1970s, when China began the transition from a planned to a market econ-
omy. Historically, the government primarily relied on banks to achieve eco-
nomic goals (Linton [2006]). In the 1960s and 1970s, when China’s econ-
omy was centrally planned, banks granted loans to SOEs based on national
development plans. Before 1979, People’s Bank of China (PBOC) served
both as the central bank and the source of, and location for, most bank
loans and deposits (Lardy [1998]). China’s banking industry expanded in
the early 1980s, when it established a two-tier system with the PBOC as
the central bank, and a second tier comprised of the “Big Four” wholly
state-owned specialized banks (i.e., Bank of China, China Construction
Bank, Agricultural Bank of China, and Industrial and Commercial Bank
of China), which took over the lending functions of the PBOC. Lend-
ing based on government direction and polices rather than on commer-
cial principles predominated in the Big Four in the 1980s and early 1990s
(Linton [2006]).
During the 1990s, the asset quality of SBs deteriorated significantly as a
result of the policy to lend to SOEs. SOEs had little incentive or ability to
repay the loans because they were also required to provide costly public
services (Green [2004]). In 1994, to relieve the losses of policy lending, the
government attempted to remove this function from the Big Four by estab-
lishing three policy banks.1 In addition, four state-owned asset management
companies were created to take over RMB 1.4 trillion of nonperforming
loans from the Big Four. Although there is no explicit deposit insurance in
China, the government provides implicit insurance in the sense that it will
step in to help financially troubled SBs (Berger et al. [2009]).2
Two major pieces of economic reform legislation came into effect in
1995. The 1995 Central Bank Law of China confirmed PBOC’s central bank
status and limited the influence of local governments in loan-granting de-
cisions. The 1995 Commercial Bank Law of China officially commercial-
ized the operations of the major SBs by directing them toward commercial
1 The three policy banks are: Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADBC), China
Development Bank (CDB), and Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM). They are expected to
fund infrastructure and development projects and provide financing predominantly to SOEs.
Specifically, ADBC took over the policy lending role of Agricultural Bank of China, CDB took
over the policy lending role of China Construction Bank, and, to a lesser extent, Industrial and
Commercial Bank of China and EXIM took over the policy lending role of Bank of China.
2 However, things changed in the late 1990s. For example, in 1999, when Guangdong In-
ternational Trust and Investment Corporation went bankrupt due to its inability to repay out-
standing debt in excess of US$ 5 billion, the central government did not assume the insurance
role as creditors expected. As a result, the debt holders received an average of only 12.54% of
their initial investment.
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• China Development Bank 
• Agricultural Development Bank of China 
• Export-Import Bank of China 
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FIG. 2.—Structure of China’s banking industry (2001–2006). 1The Big Four banks (state-
owned) are Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, Agricultural Bank
of China, and China Construction Bank. 2National joint stock banks (state-controlled) in-
clude Bank of Communications, Shanghai Pudong Development Bank, China CITIC Bank,
China Everbright Bank, China Merchants Bank, China Huaxia Bank, Guangdong Develop-
ment Bank, Shenzhen Development Bank, and Fujian Development and Industrial Bank.
business based on market principles of capital adequacy, profitability, risk,
and liquidity.3
The government further expanded the banking industry by establish-
ing national joint-stock commercial banks, city banks, and rural and ur-
ban credit cooperatives. In 1996, the nation’s first private bank, China
Minsheng Bank, was founded by 59 private institutional shareholders. It
has carved out a niche lending to small- and medium-sized NSOEs. As of
2006, China’s commercial banking system consisted of the Big Four, 10 na-
tional joint-stock commercial banks, 123 city commercial banks, and several
medium- or small-sized private banks. The structure of China’s banking in-
dustry is summarized in figure 2.
Since 2001, strengthening the monitoring of the banking industry has
been atop the government’s agenda. One influential attempt was to create
the China Banking Regulatory Commission in 2003 to oversee reforms and
regulations. The government also set up guidelines to encourage strategic
foreign investments—foreigners can now own up to 25% of any domestic
bank. Another strategy of regulators to improve banks’ corporate gover-
nance is to encourage them to list on stock exchanges. Since 1999, 7 of the
3 Despite the law, the government continued to intervene in the commercial banks’ busi-
ness decisions through tight restrictions on banks’ deposit and lending rates of interest (Brean
[2007]).
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10 national joint-stock commercial banks as well as China Minsheng Bank
have gone public.4
2.2 REFORM OF CHINA’S SOEs
Until 1978, China had a centrally planned economy in which all compa-
nies were owned by the state. Since the early 1980s, China has instituted a
series of economic reforms to transition from a centrally planned toward
a market economy. One of the most significant reforms was corporatiza-
tion of previously owned SOEs. Corporatization involves initial public of-
fering of a minority portion of state shares to nonstate parties who can
trade their shares freely on the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges,
while the majority ownership of these listed companies is still controlled by
the parent state enterprises. It aims to convert SOEs from state sole pro-
prietorships into modern Western-style corporations without jeopardizing
dominant public, but not necessarily state, ownership (Xu et al. [2005]).
While many decision rights have been delegated to the corporatized SOEs,
the government retains the ultimate decision right concerning disposal of
assets and mergers and acquisitions of these listed firms, and the right to
appoint the CEO.
Lack of rights to dispose of state assets and engage in mergers and acqui-
sitions to a large extent ensures that SOEs have low bankruptcy risk because
they can be subsidized by the government when they face financial distress
(Faccio et al. [2006]). To bail out SOEs, the government typically adopts
one or some combination of the following: reducing the tax burden, in-
jecting capital to repay part of the debt, allowing debt-for-equity swaps, and
establishing state-owned asset management companies to transfer debt bur-
dens. The government, in effect, serves as an insurance provider for SOEs.
An important consequence of the government’s right to appoint CEOs of
SOEs is that CEOs face multiple (and often divergent) goals. In a transition
economy such as China’s, maintaining social stability is critical to economic
growth. Bai et al. [2000] analytically show that SOEs are needed to continue
their role in providing social welfare because independent institutions for
social safety are not in place and firms with strong profit incentives have
little interest in promoting social stability. Since CEOs of SOEs are usually
current or former government bureaucrats, their promotion and compen-
sation are measured more by various political and social objectives than by
operating and financial performance (Fan et al. [2007]). Given the lack
of a strong incentive to improve reported performance, clearly delineated
4 Three of the Big Four went public in 2006 and 2007. They are now listed either outside or
inside mainland China. The public shares issued in Hong Kong or in other locations outside
mainland China are not subject to the 25% restriction on foreign ownership.
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profitability targets, and stock-based compensation, CEOs of SOEs have rel-
atively little direct incentive to manage earnings.5
SBs often lend to SOEs for (political, employment, and tax) reasons
other than profitability. However, Cull and Xu [2000] find that, despite
their state ownership, SBs are more effective than the government in finan-
cial resource allocation. Cull and Xu propose three explanations. First, not
all bank lending is conducted under the state plan (Lardy [1998]). World
Bank [1996] also reports that banks have considerable discretion over loans
for working capital. Second, interviews with bank managers reveal that their
compensation is partially based on the quality of their lending. Even though
they have to make many lending decisions under government intervention,
bank managers still have economic incentives to identify good credit risks.
Third, with all the reforms made in the SBs and SOEs, it may become easier
and more important to screen borrowers.
Unlike SOEs, NSOEs face substantial capital access barriers, which have
become one of the most binding constraints on their growth (Linton
[2006]). Loan granting decisions to NSOEs are made on a more compet-
itive basis and place more weight on the content and credibility of the in-
formation in the financial statements because there are few noneconomic
reasons for lending to NSOEs.
3. Hypotheses
The argument that lenders demand conservative accounting is devel-
oped in Western economies where debt contracts are written based on the
borrower’s accounting performance. If accounting-based covenants are vi-
olated, lenders should have contractual rights to step in and protect their
investments. If such covenants do not exist in China, then there is no rea-
son for accounting conservatism to manifest as an efficient debt contract-
ing technology. Therefore, we first validate the assumption that accounting-
based covenants are employed in debt contracts in China. Since there is no
database of private lending agreements available in China, we are unable
to provide large-sample evidence on accounting-based covenants. However,
we were able to obtain 20 loan agreements between banks and their SOE
and NSOE clients.6 A careful review of these contracts indicates that both
SBs and NSBs use accounting-based covenants and both SOEs and NSOEs
5 Nevertheless, they may have indirect incentives to manage earnings. For example,
Aharony et al. [2000] argue that the Chinese government may direct the SOEs seeking over-
seas listing toward earnings management, with the hope of obtaining as high an IPO price and
as much foreign currency as possible. Aharony et al. analyze the behavior of ROA and selected
earnings components in the two years preceding and the three years following the IPO and
find that the median firm ROA peaks in the IPO year and declines thereafter.
6 We are grateful to China Construction Bank, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China,
China Merchants Bank, China Minsheng Bank, and Xiamen International Bank for providing
the loan agreements. Because of confidentiality concerns, we are required by the banks to
withhold the names of the borrowers.
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face accounting-based covenants. We present examples of the accounting-
based covenants included in these contracts in the appendix.7 We believe
these contracts and their accounting-based covenants are representative of
debt contracts in China. Hu [2004] also documents that Chinese banks
often use debt-to-assets ratio, current ratio, quick ratio, interest coverage
ratio, EBITDA, and CFO in debt covenants, indicating that use of (both bal-
ance sheet and income statement) accounting numbers in debt covenants
is prevalent in China.
An equally important assumption is that Chinese courts enforce lenders’
contractual rights in the event of default. Again, without such an enforce-
ment mechanism, there is little role for accounting conservatism in debt
contracting. We find this assumption to be valid based on our review of the
information on loan-related litigation published in the notes to the annual
financial statements. During our sample period (2001–2006), we identify
1,269 loan-related lawsuits or claims against all listed firms. These include
641 SOEs and 503 NSOEs that were sued for defaulting on their own or
their guaranteed loan repayment.8 We note that most, if not all, outcomes
of the litigation favor the lenders with solid contractual rights. Yu’s [2008]
survey results of how Chinese banks protect themselves when borrowers run
into financial distress and/or default on loan repayment further support
our assumption. He finds that Chinese banks primarily use two methods to
protect their investment: (1) legal protection of their loan investments and
contractual rights through the court system, and (2) expedited collection
of undue loans or increase in collateral.
Given that the above two assumptions are valid and that lenders are con-
cerned about default risk, the demand for conservative accounting should
increase with the likelihood that the firm will have insufficient net assets
to cover its loans. When SOEs run into financial trouble, they often look
to the government for additional funding, a phenomenon referred to as
a soft budget constraint. Although eliminating the soft budget constraint
is critical to achieving successful economic reform, it continues to exist in
China even after corporatization of SOEs (Lin and Tan [1999]). The gov-
ernment may not allow SOEs to become bankrupt due to concerns about
social stability during the transition period. In addition, all SOEs except
those founded after economic reform inherited some policy burdens from
the previous system (Lin et al. [1998]).9 Because these policy burdens may
result in losses, SOEs bargain with the government for ex ante policy fa-
vors, such as access to low-interest loans, tax relief, and tariff protection,
7 We find accounting-based covenants in all of the 20 loan agreements. For brevity, we
present only 10 examples, the most representative ones, in the appendix. The remaining
10 loan agreements have very similar accounting-based covenants to those illustrated in the
appendix.
8 The remaining 125 firms are township-village enterprises, which are excluded from our
analyses.
9 The major policy burdens are: retirement pensions and other welfare costs, redundant
workers, and persistence of price distortions.
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to compensate for the losses. If the politically favored SOEs are still in fi-
nancial trouble, they again look to the government for some ex post finan-
cial assistance, which is the norm under the soft budget constraint (Lin
and Tan [1999]).10 Unlike SOEs, NSOEs do not enjoy the government’s
implicit insurance. As a result, lenders suffer from loan losses up to the
contracted sum when NSOEs cannot generate sufficient net assets to cover
their promised payments.
Besides the traditional soft budget constraint, SOEs may have lower de-
fault risk for two other reasons. First, the Chinese government has been
engaged in the corporatization or partial privatization of previously owned
SOEs since the early 1980s. The government is widely known for its strong
commitment to improving the SOEs’ corporate governance and financial
performance, and the investment environment in the Chinese capital mar-
ket. Therefore, the government has strong incentives to keep the SOEs fi-
nancially sound. If SOEs perform poorly, the government’s ability to con-
tinue the partial privatization program is likely to be adversely affected.
Therefore, even without the concerns about social stability or policy bur-
dens, the government may still be willing to bail out SOEs and prevent
them from defaulting on the loan repayment.
Second, it is likely that the government carves out the most profitable
areas of its SOEs for privatization. In China, the competition to get listed
on the stock exchanges has been extremely intense. The SOEs that suc-
ceeded in the partial privatization and IPO process are among the better
performing ones. Therefore, the listed SOEs may have lower default risk
simply because they are the most profitable firms chosen by the Chinese
government to privatize.
The above discussion on the differences between SOEs and NSOEs sug-
gests that lenders will be less concerned with downside risk for SOEs than
for NSOEs. Consequently, the demand for conservative accounting, incor-
porated in debt contracts, will be weaker for SOEs than for NSOEs.
Given the flexibility in application of Chinese accounting standards,
there is sufficient supply elasticity to respond to differences between SOEs
and NSOEs in the demand for conservative accounting.11 Thus, the pri-
mary driver for the level of accounting conservatism to differ between SOEs
and NSOEs is its demand. Holding the cost of conservative accounting con-
stant, we expect cross-sectional differences in conservatism to be related to
the type of borrowing firm, that is, whether the borrower is an SOE or an
NSOE. Accordingly, our first hypothesis is as follows:
10 Strictly speaking, the government should only be responsible for the losses caused by
policy burdens. In practice, however, it is very hard for the government to distinguish between
the policy-induced and non-policy-induced losses. And, because managers of SOEs have in-
centives to attribute all their losses to policies, the government often has to bear responsibility
for all the SOE losses (Lin et al. [1998]).
11 Ball and Shivakumar [2005] make similar arguments for the supply of accounting con-
servatism for public and private firms in the United Kingdom.
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H1: SOEs adopt less conservative accounting than NSOEs.
Many studies implicitly assume that lenders are homogeneous (e.g.,
Zhang [2008], Ahmed et al. [2002]). This assumption may not be appro-
priate in China, where fundamental differences in objective functions ex-
ist between SBs and NSBs. Researchers take three different perspectives
in explaining the existence and the role of SBs: social, agency, and politi-
cal (Sapienza [2004]). Under the social view, SBs maximize broader social
objectives, whereas NSBs maximize profits. Stiglitz and Weiss [1981] and
Greenwald and Stiglitz [1986] argue that public financial institutions are
created to cure market failures in financial and credit markets. Accord-
ingly, the objective function of SBs should be to direct resources to socially
profitable projects or to firms that have difficulty in accessing other funds.
Under the agency view, public financial institutions are also created to
cure market failures and to seek social welfare maximization. However,
given that they face multiple and nonmeasurable goals, their managers of-
ten have low-powered incentives (Tirole [1994]). Although SBs still allocate
resources to socially profitable projects, the lack of sufficient incentives in
their contracts leads their managers to exert less effort (or divert more re-
sources) than would their non-state-owned counterparts.
Unlike the social and agency views, the political view assumes that politi-
cians are self-interested individuals who pursue personal objectives rather
than maximizing social welfare. According to this view, politicians create
SBs not to allocate financial resources to socially profitable projects, but to
seek personal political objectives, such as providing jobs for voters and di-
recting resources to friends and political supporters (Shleifer and Vishny
[1998]).
Under all these three views, SBs are expected to be less concerned with
and less effective at monitoring borrowers’ default risk than their non-
state-owned counterparts. Berger et al. [2009] compare the efficiency of
the Big Four SBs, Non-Big Four SBs, private domestic banks, and foreign
banks over 1994–2003. They find that foreign banks are the most profit ef-
ficient, followed by private domestic banks. SBs, particularly the Big Four,
are the least efficient.12 In addition to differences in objective functions,
information-based theories of banking relationships (Stein [2002]) can
also help explain why foreign banks’ demand for high-quality, “hard” (e.g.,
financial) information may exceed the demand of domestic banks. Foreign
banks are less able to process “soft” (e.g., nonfinancial) information about
local firms because of their small size in the host country and because their
headquarters are located in another country. Therefore, foreign banks are
more likely to enter into relationships with more conservative firms.
In sum, SBs and NSBs have different objective functions, so they have
differential demand for assurance of sufficient net assets to cover loan
12 Berger et al. [2009] define a bank’s profit efficiency as how close it is to the most prof-
itable bank in the sample.
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repayments. We predict that as firms get more loans from SBs, the demand
from lenders for accounting conservatism will be weaker. Accordingly, our
second hypothesis is as follows:
H2: Firms adopt less conservative accounting as the fraction of loans
from SBs increases.
4. Research Design
4.1 MEASURE OF CONSERVATISM
Following Ball and Shivakumar [2005, 2006], we estimate conservatism
using the following piecewise linear relation between accruals and cash
flows:
ACCt = ψ0 + ψ1DCF Ot + ψ2CF Ot + ψ3DCF Ot × CF Ot + εt , (1)
where ACC is accruals scaled by beginning total assets. Accruals are defined
as earnings before exceptional items and extraordinary items minus cash
flows from operations. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by begin-
ning total assets. Cash flows from operations are defined as earnings before
exceptional items and extraordinary items + depreciation − (working
capital), and (working capital) = (current assets) − cash − (current
liabilities) + (current portion of long-term loans). DCFO is a dummy vari-
able that equals 1 if CFO is negative and 0 otherwise.
Ball and Shivakumar [2005, 2006] argue that this piecewise linear re-
gression essentially captures two roles of accruals: mitigation of noise in
cash flows and asymmetric recognition of unrealized gains and losses. ψ2
measures the extent to which accruals mitigate noise in cash flows and is
predicted to be negative. Asymmetrically timely gain and loss recognition
results in asymmetry in the relation between accruals and cash flows. Unre-
alized losses, as accrual charges against earnings, are likely to be recognized
more quickly than unrealized gains. This asymmetry in timeliness of recog-
nition implies that the negative relation between cash flows and accruals
is less pronounced in periods with unrealized losses than in periods with
unrealized gains. Therefore, ψ3 is expected to be positive.
To the extent that negative CFO is a noisy proxy for downward revisions to
the present value of future cash flows, Ball and Shivakumar’s [2005, 2006]
measure of accounting conservatism suffers from a standard measurement
error problem. We therefore employ two alternative measures of account-
ing conservatism to check the robustness of our results. We discuss the re-
sults of these additional tests in section 8.4.
4.2 MAIN TEST
H1 hypothesizes that SOEs adopt less conservative accounting than
NSOEs. H2 hypothesizes that accounting conservatism decreases as the
firm obtains a larger fraction of its loans from SBs. We augment
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equation (1) as follows to test these two hypotheses:
ACCt = ϕ0 + ϕ1DCF Ot + ϕ2CFOt + ϕ3DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ4SOEt
+ϕ5SOEt × DCFOt + ϕ6SOEt × CFOt + ϕ7SOEt × DCFOt
×CFOt + ϕ8LSBt + ϕ9LSBt × DCFOt + ϕ10LSBt × CFOt
+ϕ11LSBt × DCFOt × CFOt + εt , (2)
where SOE is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is an SOE and 0 if
it is an NSOE. We classify borrowers as SOEs and NSOEs based on the own-
ership type of their ultimate controlling shareholders. SOEs are defined
as those borrowers directly or indirectly owned or controlled by state asset
management bureaus or other SOEs controlled by the central government
or local governments. NSOEs are defined as those borrowers controlled by
private investors.13 ϕ3 and ϕ3 + ϕ7 indicate the level of conservatism for
NSOEs and SOEs, respectively. The coefficient of interest is ϕ7, which mea-
sures the difference in the level of conservatism between SOEs and NSOEs.
H1 predicts that ϕ7 < 0.
LSB measures the percentage of loans from SBs. It is calculated as the
ratio of total loans from SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the
year for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial state-
ments.14 We are interested in ϕ11, which captures the association between
the lender’s state ownership and the borrower’s accounting conservatism.
H2 predicts that ϕ11 < 0.
5. Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
Our initial sample consists of all firms listed on the Shanghai and Shen-
zhen Stock Exchanges for the years 2001 to 2006 that are included in the
China Securities Markets and Accounting Research Database (CSMAR).
Our sample period starts from 2001 because China’s entry into the WTO
triggered a new set of rules that took effect in 2001. Additionally, some ex-
isting regulations and laws in the banking industry were revised to com-
ply with the WTO agreements. According to the Chinese government’s
promised agenda, there will be more liberalization of interest rates, less re-
striction on ownership takeovers and mergers and acquisitions, and greater
13 We exclude township-village enterprises from our analyses. A township-village enterprise
refers to a business unit that belongs to all residents of a rural community where it is also
usually located. According to Che and Qian [1998], it is neither an SOE nor an NSOE. They
argue that it is best characterized as a community enterprise with a governance structure in
which the community government has control.
14 Under Chinese GAAP, if the firm has significant outstanding loans or the collateral items
are of significant value, it is required to disclose relevant information in the annual financial
statements. We find that, in total, our sample firms disclosed details of 97% of their loans out-
standing. The disclosed loans presumably have a significant impact on firms’ financial status.
Since 97% of the loans outstanding are disclosed by our sample firms, we are less concerned
about a potential self-selection issue in regard to the firms’ disclosure choices.
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freedom of operational and geographical scope in the banking industry
(Berger et al. [2009]). The reform and the opening up of the banking in-
dustry have led to substantial bank ownership changes since 2001, with im-
portant implications for bank efficiency and lending behavior.15 Given the
substantially more market-oriented environment after 2001, Chinese banks
are likely to value borrowers’ conservatism to a larger degree. By focusing
on the post-WTO period, we are able to increase the power of our tests to
detect cross-sectional variation in lenders’ demand for conservatism.
We eliminate 325 observations with insufficient data to calculate accruals,
and an additional 321 observations related to township-village enterprises
and firms whose ultimate controlling shareholder cannot be identified. Of
the remaining 6,949 observations, we delete 6 observations in the financial
industry, 340 observations with no outstanding loans, and 84 observations
with insufficient data to calculate various control variables, leaving us with
6,519 observations. We eliminate an additional 1,086 observations because
we are unable to identify the sources of their major loans from their finan-
cial statements. The final sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations.
Panel A of table 1 reports the effects of the sample selection criteria on
sample size.
The first column in panel B of table 1 details the distribution of all sample
firms across various industries. The industry composition of our sample is
similar to that of the population of firms on CSMAR. The most heavily rep-
resented industry is Manufacturing (59.14% of sample observations). The
next two columns compare the industry distribution between SOEs and
NSOEs. We find a larger percentage of SOEs in the Mining, Utilities, Trans-
portation, and Services industries in our sample. NSOEs are more likely
to be in the Information and Technology, Real Estate, and Conglomerates
industries. The difference in industry distribution is not surprising because
SOEs typically operate in the more traditional and asset-intensive industries
such as Mining, Utilities, and Transportation, industries with high entry bar-
riers for NSOEs.16
We provide descriptive statistics on firm characteristics for the full sam-
ple in panel A of table 2. The mean (median) accruals and cash flows
from operations are −0.051 (−0.045) and 0.077 (0.070), respectively. SOEs
comprise 76.9% of sample firms. Not surprisingly, the majority of loans
are issued by SBs (98.5%). These loans can be further decomposed into
loans from policy SBs (1.2%) and loans from commercial SBs (97.3%).
Further analysis reveals that 18.1% of the sample firms obtain at least some
loans from NSBs. This indicates that the NSB loan market measured by the
15 For example, using bank excess reserve, loan-to-asset ratio, and deposit-to-loan ratio as
proxies for bank prudence, Jia [2009] shows that SBs have become more prudent as a result
of the reforms.
16 To test whether differences in industry composition between SOEs and NSOEs can ex-
plain our results, we add interactive industry dummy variables to equation (2) as a sensitivity
test. The untabulated results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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T A B L E 1
Descriptive Information on Sample Selection and Industry Distribution
Panel A: Selection criteria
Total firm-year observations available on CSMAR from 2001 to 2006 7,595
Less:
Observations with missing data to calculate accruals (325)
Firms controlled by local township and village governments or whose (321)
ultimate controlling shareholder cannot be identified
Firms in the financial industry (6)
Observations with no loan balances (340)
Observations with missing data to calculate control variables (84)
Subtotal: 6,519
Less:
Observations with lenders’ information unavailable in the financial reports (1,086)
Final sample 5,433
Panel B: Sample composition by industry and by ownership type




136 2.50% 100 2.39% 36 2.88%
Mining 89 1.64 80 1.91 9 0.72
Manufacturing 3,213 59.14 2,486 59.45 727 58.11
Utilities 237 4.36 225 5.38 12 0.96
Construction 99 1.82 81 1.94 18 1.44




326 6.00 204 4.88 122 9.75
Wholesale
trade
411 7.56 336 8.03 75 6.00
Real estate 159 2.93 108 2.58 51 4.08
Services 162 2.98 141 3.37 21 1.68
Entertainment 39 0.72 26 0.62 13 1.04
Conglomerates 354 6.52 212 5.07 142 11.35
Total 5,433 100% 4,182 100% 1,251 100%
Panel A explains the sample selection process. Panel B reports the industry distribution of the full sam-
ple, SOE subsample, and NSOE subsample. Industry groups are based on the China Securities Regulatory
Commission’s classification.
number of clients is economically significant, although it is relatively small
when measured by the total amount of loans. We also note that 20.1% of
the sample firms report at least some loans from policy SBs, indicating that
despite the economically small amount of loans, policy SBs still lend to a
nontrivial number of firms during our sample period. Various performance
and risk measures (e.g., size, leverage, and market-to-book ratio) suggest
that on average our sample firms are financially healthy.
Panel B of table 2 reports descriptive statistics for SOEs and NSOEs sepa-
rately. Interestingly, NSOEs report more loans from SBs than SOEs (99.1%
vs. 98.4%). However, this does not necessarily mean that SBs favor NSOEs.
In fact, bank discrimination against firms in the private sector in China is
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T A B L E 2
Firm Characteristics of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Non-State-Owned Enterprises
(NSOEs)
Panel A: Firm characteristics of the full sample
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Q1 Q3
ACC −0.051 −0.045 0.090 −0.108 0.011
CFO 0.077 0.070 0.106 0.004 0.144
SOE 0.769 1 0.421 1 1
LSB 0.985 1 0.076 1 1
SB PLCY 0.012 0 0.081 0 0
SB COMM 0.973 1 0.114 1 1
SIZE 21.41 21.37 0.829 20.854 21.883
LEV 0.321 0.200 0.422 0.087 0.416
MB 3.554 2.538 15.151 1.708 4.080
Panel B: Firm characteristics by ownership type: SOE versus NSOE
SOE NSOE Difference
Variable Mean Median Std. Mean Median Std. Mean Median
ACC −0.051 −0.045 0.088 −0.049 −0.042 0.097 0.63 1.02
CFO 0.081 0.073 0.103 0.065 0.059 0.114 −4.32∗∗∗ −4.55∗∗∗
LSB 0.984 1 0.083 0.991 1 0.053 3.52∗∗∗ 3.47∗∗∗
SB PLCY 0.014 0 0.089 0.004 0 0.042 −5.61∗∗∗ −4.54∗∗∗
SB COMM 0.970 1 0.123 0.987 1 0.070 6.26∗∗∗ 4.55∗∗∗
SIZE 21.52 21.47 0.827 21.03 21.02 0.716 −20.59∗∗∗ −18.73∗∗∗
LEV 0.306 0.190 0.365 0.371 0.240 0.571 3.76∗∗∗ 6.08∗∗∗
MB 3.346 2.540 12.789 4.252 2.508 21.209 1.43 1.02
Observations 4,182 1,251
Table 2 reports firm characteristics of Chinese firms between 2001 and 2006. Panels A and B present
descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for the full sample and the SOE/NSOE subsamples, respectively.
ACC is accruals scaled by beginning total assets; accruals are defined as earnings before exceptional items
and extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by
beginning total assets; cash flows from operations are defined as earnings before exceptional items and
extraordinary items + Depreciation − (Working capital). (Working capital) = (Current assets) −
Cash − (Current liabilities) + (Current portion of long-term loans). SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0
otherwise. LSB is the ratio of total loans from SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which
the sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SB PLCY is the ratio of total loans from
policy SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in
the financial statements. SB COMM is the ratio of total loans from commercial SBs to total loans outstanding
at the end of the year for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SIZE is
the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-term
debt scaled by total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio.
t-tests are used to test differences between the SOE and NSOE means. Wilcoxon two-sample tests are
used to test differences between the SOE and NSOE medians.
∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 0.01 level in a two-tailed test.
well documented (Brandt and Li [2003]). Compared to SOEs, NSOEs get
a relatively small percentage of loans from policy SBs (0.4% vs. 1.4%). Most
of their loans are issued by commercial SBs (98.7%). SOEs have lower fi-
nancial risk than NSOEs because they are larger and have lower leverage.
6. Main Results
We present the main results of testing H1 and H2 in table 3. Model 1
can be viewed as a base model version of equation (2) in that it constrains
the level of conservatism to be homogenous across all firms. The results are
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T A B L E 3
Accounting Conservatism of Chinese firms with Different Borrower and Lender Ownership Types: Tests
Using Ball and Shivakumar’s [2005, 2006] Accruals-Based Measure of Accounting Conservatism
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pred.
Variable Sign Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
(Coeff.) Estimate Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT (ϕ0) ? 0.0003 0.09 −0.006 −0.28 −0.312 −5.37∗∗∗
DCFO (ϕ1) ? 0.006 1.63 0.075 1.62 −0.115 −0.73
CFO (ϕ2) − −0.652 −22.37∗∗∗ −0.389 −2.44∗∗ −1.566 −3.36∗∗∗
DCFO × CFO (ϕ3) + 0.142 2.90∗∗∗ 1.885 2.51∗∗ 3.217 1.70∗
SOE (ϕ4) ? 0.0004 0.08 −0.005 −1.45
SOE × DCFO (ϕ5) ? 0.003 0.30 −0.001 −0.16
SOE × CFO (ϕ6) ? 0.023 0.69 −0.022 −0.81
SOE × DCFO × CFO (ϕ7) − −0.300 −2.43∗∗ −0.216 −2.14∗∗
LSB (ϕ8) ? 0.006 0.28 −0.001 −0.09
LSB × DCFO (ϕ9) ? −0.074 −1.63∗ −0.072 −1.18
LSB × CFO (ϕ10) ? −0.284 −1.81∗ −0.109 −1.27
LSB × DCFO × CFO (ϕ11) − −1.599 −2.14∗∗ −1.725 −2.07∗∗
SIZE (ϕ12) ? 0.015 5.44∗∗∗
SIZE × DCFO (ϕ13) ? 0.009 1.56
SIZE × CFO (ϕ14) ? 0.047 2.38∗∗
SIZE × CFO × DCFO (ϕ15) − −0.059 −0.88
LEV (ϕ16) ? −0.001 −0.03
LEV × DCFO (ϕ17) ? 0.0001 0.03
LEV × CFO (ϕ18) ? −0.034 −1.78∗
LEV × CFO × DCFO (ϕ19) + 0.044 1.83∗
MB (ϕ20) ? 0.0001 0.09
MB × DCFO (ϕ21) ? −0.0001 −0.09
MB × CFO (ϕ22) ? 0.0007 0.07
MB × CFO × DCFO (ϕ23) + 0.0007 0.07
Adj. R2 0.567 0.576 0.624
This table presents estimates of accounting conservatism of Chinese firms with different borrower and
lender ownership types using the following regression models:
Model 1: ACCt = ϕ0 + ϕ1DCFOt + ϕ2CFOt + ϕ3DCFOt × CFOt
Model 2: ACCt = ϕ0 + ϕ1DCFOt + ϕ2CFOt + ϕ3DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ4SOEt + ϕ5SOEt × DCFOt
+ ϕ6SOEt × CFOt + ϕ7SOEt × DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ8LSBt + ϕ9LSBt × DCFOt
+ ϕ10LSBt × CFOt + ϕ11LSBt × DCFOt × CFOt + εt
Model 3: ACCt = ϕ0 + ϕ1DCFOt + ϕ2CFOt + ϕ3DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ4SOEt + ϕ5SOEt × DCFOt
+ ϕ6SOEt × CFOt + ϕ7SOEt × DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ8LSBt + ϕ9LSBt × DCFOt
+ ϕ10LSBt × CFOt + ϕ11LSBt × DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ12SIZEt + ϕ13SIZEt × DCFOt
+ ϕ14SIZEt × CFOt + ϕ15SIZEt × DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ16LEVt + ϕ17LEVt × DCFOt
+ ϕ18LEVt × CFOt + ϕ19LEVt × DCFOt × CFOt + ϕ20MBt + ϕ21MBt × DCFOt
+ ϕ22MBt × CFOt + ϕ23MBt × DCFOt × CFOt + εt
The sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, of which 76.9% are SOEs.
On average, 98.5% of the loans are issued by SBs in our sample. The t-values are based on two-way, cluster-
robust standard errors adjusting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. ACC is accruals scaled by
beginning total assets; accruals are defined as earnings before exceptional items and extraordinary items
minus cash flows from operations. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets; cash
flows from operations are defined as earnings before exceptional items and extraordinary items + Depreci-
ation − (Working capital). (Working capital) = (Current assets) − Cash − (Current liabilities) +
(Current portion of long-term loans). DCFO is 1 if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an
SOE, 0 otherwise. LSB is the ratio of total loans from SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year
for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets.
MB is market-to-book ratio.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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reported in the first column. The coefficient on CFO is significantly nega-
tive (ϕ2 = −0.652, t = −22.37), consistent with accruals mitigating noise
in cash flows from operations.17 The coefficient on DCFO × CFO is positive
and statistically significant (ϕ3 = 0.142, t = 2.90), suggesting that the nega-
tive relation between accruals and cash flows is moderated when cash flows
are negative. This indicates that, on average, our sample firms recognize
unrealized losses via accruals in a timelier manner than unrealized gains.
We report the results of estimating equation (2) in the next column
(model 2). The results indicate that when cash flows are positive, the neg-
ative relation between accruals and cash flows is not significantly different
between SOEs and NSOEs (ϕ6 = 0.023, t = 0.69). However, ϕ7, which repre-
sents the difference in the level of conservatism between SOEs and NSOEs,
is significantly negative (ϕ7 = −0.300, t = −2.43), implying that compared
to NSOEs, SOEs accrue unrealized losses in cash-loss years in a less timely
manner than they do unrealized gains in cash-profit years. Turning to the
relation between lender state ownership and accounting conservatism, we
find that the level of accounting conservatism decreases as the fraction of
loans from SBs increases (ϕ11 = −1.599, t = −2.14).
To control for other common determinants of conservatism based on
prior research, we augment equation (2) by adding size, leverage, and
market-to-book ratio along with their respective interactions with CFO,
DCFO, and CFO × DCFO (LaFond and Roychowdhury [2008], Khan and
Watts [2009]), and report the results in the column labeled model 3. We
find that conservatism increases with leverage and is not significantly re-
lated to size and market-to-book ratio. Although including these three vari-
ables in the regression improves the explanatory power (the adjusted R2 in-
creases by 4.8%), our main results remain qualitatively unchanged. We also
include return on assets (ROA) and percentage of ownership held by the
ultimate shareholder as additional interactive control variables, and find
similar results (untabulated).
To summarize, using Ball and Shivakumar’s [2005, 2006] accruals-based
measure of conservatism, we find strong support for H1, that SOEs adopt
less conservative accounting than NSOEs, and for H2, that firms adopt less
conservative accounting as they get a higher fraction of loans from SBs.18
17 In order to control for both cross-sectional and time-series dependence, we report t-
statistics based on two-way, cluster-robust standard errors (Petersen [2009], Gow et al. [2010]).
18 Our research design involves interactions between two continuous variables (e.g., LSB
and CFO), which may potentially induce multicollinearity. We find that the interactions be-
tween continuous variables in our model have variance-inflation factors greater than 10. Mul-
ticollinearity may reduce the power of our tests and bias against rejecting our null hypotheses.
To mitigate the concern with multicollinearity, we first mean-center the continuous variables
and then interact them (Neter et al. [1989], Aiken and West [1991]). Our results generally
hold in our main and additional analyses with only one exception. When we use a time-series
test of timely loss recognition to measure accounting conservatism, we fail to find a significant
relation between lender state ownership and accounting conservatism.
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7. Alternative Explanations
In addition to the lender’s concern about default risk, SOEs and NSOEs
are different along many other dimensions that may potentially result in
differences in the timeliness of their recognition of unrealized losses. In
this section, we perform tests to rule out three alternative explanations for
the results of H1.
7.1 ASYMMETRY IN THE PERSISTENCE OF ECONOMIC LOSSES BETWEEN SOEs
AND NSOEs
The first alternative explanation is that the economic losses incurred by
NSOEs (indicated by negative cash flows in the current period) are more
transitory than those incurred by SOEs. Under H1, an implicit assump-
tion is that SOEs and NSOEs have the same degree of loss persistence.
If economic losses are more transitory for NSOEs than for SOEs, the re-
sults may merely reflect this difference in the persistence of losses between
SOEs and NSOEs rather than the difference in conservative accounting.
The economic losses incurred by NSOEs may be more transitory because
NSOEs face a tighter financial budget and are more inclined to discontinue
unprofitable projects in a timelier manner than SOEs. SOEs sometimes de-
viate from maximizing economic profits in order to achieve certain politi-
cal goals. They are favored and supported by the government so they are
able to continue some unprofitable projects. Given that it is easier to ver-
ify near-term losses than losses arising far into the future, the economic
(and unrealized) losses incurred by NSOEs will be recognized in a timelier
manner simply because they are more transitory than those incurred by
SOEs.
We estimate the following regression to examine whether the persistence
of economic losses differs between SOEs and NSOEs:
CFOt+1 = β0 + β1CFOt + β2DCFOt + β3DCFOt × CFOt + β4SOEt
+β5SOEt × CFOt + β6SOEt × DCFOt + β7SOEt
× DCFOt × CFOt + εt . (3)
In equation (3), β1 and β1 + β3 represent the persistence estimates for
positive cash flows (or economic gains) and negative cash flows (or eco-
nomic losses), respectively for NSOEs, and β1 + β5 and β1 + β3 + β5 +
β7 represent the corresponding estimates for SOEs. We are primarily in-
terested in β5 + β7, which indicates the difference in the persistence of
economic losses between SOEs and NSOEs.
Table 4 reports the results of estimating equation (3). We find that eco-
nomic losses are less persistent than economic gains for NSOEs (β3 =
−0.269, t = −4.44). This is consistent with NSOEs abandoning loss-making
projects in a timely manner. However, we do not detect any significant dif-
ference in the persistence of economic losses between SOEs and NSOEs
(β5 + β7 = 0.058, t = 1.48). This evidence does not support the alternative
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T A B L E 4
Difference in Persistence of Negative Cash Flows from Operations Between Chinese State-Owned
Enterprises (SOEs) and Non-State-Owned Enterprises (NSOEs)
Variable (Coeff.) Coefficient Estimate t-value
INTERCEPT (β0) 0.038 4.97∗∗∗
CFO (β1) 0.130 3.88∗∗∗
DCFO (β2) −0.016 −3.75∗∗∗
DCFO × CFO (β3) −0.269 −4.44∗∗∗
SOE (β4) 0.017 1.40
SOE × CFO (β5) 0.093 1.68∗
SOE × DCFO (β6) −0.005 −0.77
SOE × DCFO × CFO (β7) −0.035 −0.41
Adj. R2 0.028
This table reports persistence estimates of negative and positive cash flows from operations for SOEs
and NSOEs from the following regression model:
CFOt +1 = β0 + β1CFOt + β2DCFOt + β3DCFOt × CFOt + β4SOEt + β5SOEt × CFOt + β6SOEt × DCFOt
+ β7SOEt × DCFOt × CFOt + εt
The sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, of which 76.9% are SOEs.
The t-values are based on two-way, cluster-robust standard errors adjusting for cross-sectional and time-series
dependence. CFO is cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets; cash flows from operations
are defined as earnings before exceptional items and extraordinary items + Depreciation − (Working
capital). (Working capital) = (Current assets) − Cash − (Current liabilities) + (Current portion
of long-term loans). DCFO is 1 if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0 otherwise.
∗∗∗ and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01 and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
explanation that differences in the persistence of economic losses between
NSOEs and SOEs may explain the observed differences in accounting con-
servatism across NSOEs and SOEs.
7.2 DIFFERENCE IN “BIG BATH” BEHAVIOR BETWEEN SOEs AND NSOEs
The “big bath” or earnings management hypothesis is an alternative ex-
planation for differences in accounting conservatism across NSOEs and
SOEs. SOEs likely have weaker incentives to manage accounting perfor-
mance than NSOEs due to their different ownership structures and agency
relations. Many CEOs of SOEs are politically connected, current or for-
mer government bureaucrats. The appointment of politically connected
CEOs is typically linked to the government’s objectives of diverting corpo-
rate resources for social or political goals, although those objectives are
not always consistent with firm value maximization. The tradeoff between
the economic and political objectives is reflected in SOE CEOs’ compensa-
tion contracts, which typically place relatively less weight on accounting per-
formance than the compensation contracts of CEOs of profit-maximizing
NSOEs.
To examine whether there is a difference in big bath behavior be-
tween SOEs and NSOEs, we estimate the following regression for a sub-
sample of firms that are expected to have strong incentives to take a big
bath:
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DACC−t (or E N OI
−
t ) = τ0 + τ1SOEt + τ2AU Dt + τ3SIZEt + τ4LEV t
+ τ5MBt + τ6OWNERt + τ7CROSSLIST t
+ τ j
∑
j Industry Dummy j + εt , (4)
where DACCt− is income-decreasing discretionary accruals. We measure dis-
cretionary accruals, DACC , as the residual from the modified Jones model,
adjusted by a performance-matched firm (Dechow et al. [1995], Kothari
et al. [2005]).19 ENOI − is negative excessive nonoperating income. We cal-
culate ENOI as the difference between after-tax nonoperating income di-
vided by beginning total assets and its industry median value. Chen and
Yuan [2004] find that Chinese firms use nonoperating income as an earn-
ings management tool to reach the 10% ROE hurdle for rights issues. We
therefore examine whether firms manage accruals and transactions involv-
ing below-the-line items to take a big bath. AUD equals 1 if the firm’s
auditor is one of the largest 10 auditors in China and 0 otherwise, SIZE
is the natural logarithm of total assets, LEV is leverage ratio, defined as
the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets, MB is
market-to-book ratio, OWNER is percentage of ownership held by the ul-
timate shareholder, and CROSSLIST is a dummy variable that equals 1 if
the firm issues shares to foreign investors (such as B or H shares) and 0
otherwise.
We examine big bath behavior for 1,533 (1,492) observations, which have
negative premanaged earnings (negative operating income) in the current
year or suffer losses in the previous year. When current earnings take a
major hit, firms have incentives to make poor results look even worse so that
future years’ earnings will be artificially enhanced. Firms that suffer losses
in the previous year also have incentives to take a big bath in the current
period, creating cookie jar reserves in order to turn profitable and avoid
being delisted. We find 882 (976) of the 1,533 (1,492) observations take
“big baths” when we use DACC (ENOI ) to measure earnings management
behavior.
We control for other factors that may impact firms’ earnings manage-
ment behavior in equation (4), including audit quality, size, leverage,
growth, ultimate shareholder, cross-listing status, and industry. We are in-
terested in τ 1, the coefficient on SOE . A positive τ 1 will indicate that NSOEs
take more “big baths” than SOEs.
We first examine firms’ accruals-based earnings management and report
the results in panel A of table 5.20 The first column shows the results of
19 Specifically, we first calculate discretionary accruals from the modified Jones model. We
match each firm-year observation with an observation from the same industry and year on
ROA. We then measure (performance–adjusted) DACC for firm i in year t as the modified
Jones model discretionary accruals in year t minus the matched firm’s modified Jones model
discretionary accruals in year t.
20 When DACC−(+) and ENOI −(+) are used as the dependent variable, we estimate the
regression using a Tobit model.
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T A B L E 5
Difference in Big Bath Behavior Between Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) and Non-State-Owned
Enterprises (NSOEs)
Panel A: Big bath behavior measured by discretionary accruals (DACC)
Negative DACC Positive DACC All DACC
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
(Coeff.) Estimate Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT (τ 0) −0.254 −1.18 0.651 2.91∗∗∗ 0.072 0.53
SOE (τ 1) 0.031 1.51 0.002 0.11 0.016 0.80
AUD (τ 2) −0.064 −2.30∗∗ −0.016 −0.61 −0.043 −2.83∗∗∗
SIZE (τ 3) 0.008 0.75 −0.026 −2.47∗∗ −0.003 −0.41
LEV (τ 4) −0.002 −0.20 0.037 1.89∗ 0.006 0.75
MB(τ 5) −0.0004 −0.74 −0.0001 −0.28 −0.0001 −2.25∗∗
OWNER (τ 6) −0.094 −1.42 −0.096 −1.63 −0.077 −1.21
CROSSLIST (τ 7) 0.038 1.08 0.097 3.11∗∗∗ 0.082 2.54∗∗∗
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 882 651 1,533
Adj. R2 0.026 0.225 0.012
Panel B: Big bath behavior measured by excess nonoperating income (ENOI )
Negative ENOI Positive ENOI All ENOI
Variable Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value Coeff. t-value
(Coeff.) Estimate Estimate Estimate
INTERCEPT (τ 0) −0.510 −5.46∗∗∗ 0.059 2.24∗∗ −0.459 −5.52∗∗∗
SOE (τ 1) 0.013 1.46 −0.002 −1.03 0.014 1.33
AUD (τ 2) −0.014 −1.17 −0.004 −1.26 −0.028 −3.85∗∗∗
SIZE (τ 3) 0.020 4.32∗∗∗ −0.001 −1.01 0.020 4.77∗∗∗
LEV (τ 4) −0.069 −8.17∗∗∗ −0.0001 −0.03 −0.067 −2.77∗∗∗
MB (τ 5) 0.0002 1.83∗ −0.0002 −1.52 0.0001 2.55∗∗∗
OWNER (τ 6) 0.065 2.35∗∗ −0.008 −1.26 0.023 1.18
CROSSLIST (τ 7) 0.006 0.40 0.008 1.98∗∗ 0.016 1.05
Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Observations 976 516 1,492
Adj. R2 0.110 0.02 0.110
This table presents estimates of the difference in big bath behavior between SOEs and NSOEs from the
following regression model:




Industry Dummyj + εt
Panels A and B report the results of the regressions using DACC and ENOI as the dependent variables,
respectively. The sample in panel A consists of 1,533 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2006 that have
negative premanaged earnings (i.e. earnings − DACC) in the current year or suffer losses in the previous
year. The sample in panel B consists of 1,492 firm-year observations from 2001 to 2006 that have negative
operating income in the current year or suffer losses in the previous year. The column labeled Negative DACC
(ENOI ) includes only those firm-year observations with negative DACC (ENOI ). The column labeled Positive
DACC (ENOI ) includes only those firm-year observations with positive DACC (ENOI ). The column labeled
All DACC (ENOI ) includes all 1,533 (1,492) firm-year observations. We perform Tobit regression analysis
for the Negative and the Positive columns and OLS regression analysis for the All columns. The t-values are
based on two-way, cluster-robust standard errors adjusting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence.
DACC is performance-adjusted discretionary accruals, measured as the residual from the modified Jones
model adjusted by a performance-matched firm (Dechow et al. [1995], Kothari et al. [2005]). ENOI is
excess nonoperating income, measured as the after-tax nonoperating income scaled by beginning total
assets, adjusted by the industry median. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0 otherwise. AUD is 1 if the firm
is audited by one of the top 10 largest auditors in China, 0 otherwise. ROA is return on assets. SIZE is the
natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-term
debt scaled by total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio; OWNER is percentage of ownership held by the
ultimate shareholder. CROSSLIST is 1 if the firm issues shares to foreign investors (such as B or H shares),
0 otherwise.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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estimating equation (4) with DACC− as the dependent variable. Although
the coefficient on SOE is positive, it is not statistically significant (τ 1 =
0.031, t = 1.51), indicating that NSOEs do not take more big baths
than SOEs. In the second column, we examine these firms’ income-
increasing earnings management behavior by reestimating the regression
using income-increasing discretionary accruals, DACC+, as the dependent
variable. A negative coefficient on SOE will indicate that NSOEs are more
likely to manage earnings upward when they suffer losses in the previous
year or their premanaged earnings are negative in the current year. We
find the coefficient on SOE is not significantly different from zero. The
third column reports the results of estimating equation (4) using DACC as
the dependent variable. Again, the coefficient on SOE is not significant.
We next investigate whether firms manipulate below-the-line items to
manage earnings. The first column of panel B reports the results of estimat-
ing equation (4) with ENOI − as the dependent variable. We fail to detect
a significant coefficient on SOE , indicating no reliable difference between
SOEs and NSOEs in the use of nonoperating income to take a big bath.
Overall, we find that the big bath hypothesis is an unlikely alternative ex-
planation for the results of H1. However, the results should be interpreted
with caution because the insignificant coefficient on SOE could be due to
measurement errors in our measures of big bath behavior.
7.3 DIFFERENCE IN TAX INCENTIVES BETWEEN SOEs AND NSOEs
SOEs and NSOEs may also differ in their tax incentives. In particular,
SOEs may be less tax sensitive because their taxes are paid back to the ul-
timate shareholder, the state government. A tax on SOEs’ profits simply
reduces the amount of profits otherwise distributable to the government,
and therefore appears simply to move money from one government pocket
to another. Sometimes, the CEO of an SOE may be given “credit” for taxes
paid, if the government chooses to use that as a measure of how much the
SOE contributes to society. NSOEs, however, are likely more tax aggressive
because their focus is more on maximizing (private) shareholder value.
One way to reduce taxation cost is to recognize unrealized economic losses
more quickly.
Although none of our results are substantially changed after controlling
for size, which, among other things, is a control for the taxation demand
for accounting conservatism (Ball and Shivakumar [2005], Khan and Watts
[2009]), we perform a formal test using two direct measures of tax aggres-
siveness. The first measure is the effective tax rate (ETR), calculated as total
tax expense divided by pretax financial income. Following Gupta and New-
berry [1997], we set ETR to zero for firms with tax refunds and 100% for
firms with positive tax expense and negative (or zero) pretax financial in-
come. The second measure is the book-tax difference (BTD), which is the
difference between pretax financial income and taxable income divided by
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beginning total assets. We calculate taxable income as taxes paid divided by
the statutory tax rate.21 Consistent with prior research (e.g., Chen, Chen,
Cheng, and Shevlin [2010]), we find that ETR and BTD are weakly neg-
atively correlated (−0.192, p < 0.01), suggesting that they likely measure
different aspects of tax aggressiveness and/or contain measurement error.
Therefore, using both measures in our analysis should help strengthen
our inferences. We add the tax aggressiveness measure and its interactions
with CFO, DCFO, and DCFO × CFO to equation (2). For both measures, we
find that the relations between borrower and lender state ownership and
accounting conservatism are not affected after controlling for tax incen-
tives.22 The results indicate that the difference in accounting conservatism
between SOEs and NSOEs is unlikely to be entirely driven by the difference
in their tax incentives. However, we suggest that caution be exercised in in-
terpreting the results because of the potential errors-in-variables concern
with the two proxies for tax aggressiveness.
8. Additional Tests
8.1 DIFFERENCE IN THE LIKELIHOOD OF LOAN DEFAULT BETWEEN SOEs
AND NSOEs
The reasoning behind H1 is that SOEs are likely to have lower default risk
because they are politically favored. The government’s implicit insurance
role, or SOEs’ soft budget constraint, should manifest itself when SOEs run
into financial trouble. In this section, we assess the validity of our reasoning
by examining the difference in the likelihood of loan default between SOEs
and NSOEs.
As discussed in section 3, we are able to identify 641 and 503 lawsuits
or claims against SOEs and NSOEs, respectively, which default on their
own or their guaranteed loan repayment during the sample period. For
the purpose of this analysis, we focus on defaults on a firm’s own loan
repayment.23 Descriptive statistics show that 146 of the 4,182 SOE firm-
year observations (3.49%) report lawsuits or claims for defaulting on loan
21 We hand collect the statutory tax rate from the firm’s annual financial report. The nor-
mal tax rate is 33% during our sample period. However, two lower rates of 18% and 27% are
applied for certain less profitable firms. The government also provides various tax incentives to
firms in designated locations such as Special Economic Zones, the Pudong New Development
Zone in Shanghai, and Economic and Technological Development Zones.
22 We also perform the analysis using two alternative measures of accounting conservatism
(see section 8.4). We find our results are not substantially changed with two exceptions. When
we use ETR to measure tax aggressiveness and Basu’s differential timeliness measure of ac-
counting conservatism, we do not observe a significant relation between borrower state own-
ership and accounting conservatism after controlling for size, leverage, and market-to-book.
When we use BTD to measure tax aggressiveness and Basu’s differential timeliness measure of
accounting conservatism, we do not detect a significant relation between lender state owner-
ship and accounting conservatism.
23 Of the 641 (503) lawsuits against SOEs (NSOEs), 306 (312) are related to defaults on
their own loans.
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repayment, whereas 81 of the 1,251 NSOE firm-year observations (6.47%)
are sued for loan defaults.24 Univariate comparison indicates that SOEs are
significantly less likely to have loan defaults than NSOEs (t = −3.97). Be-
cause univariate analysis fails to account for differences in financial perfor-
mance and risks between SOEs and NSOEs, we estimate the following logis-
tic regression to assess the difference in likelihood of loan default between
SOEs and NSOEs after controlling for firm-specific risk and performance
factors:
DEFAULT t = α0 + α1SOEt−1 + α2SIZEt−1 + α3LEV t−1 + α4MBt−1
+α5CURRENT t−1 + α6ROAt−1 + α7INTCOV t−1
+α8WCAPt−1 + α9SALESt−1 + α10OPRCYCLEt−1
+α11AGEt−1 + α12CFOVOLt−1 + α13SALESGROWTH t−1
+α14LLOSSt−1 + αi	i Year Dummyi
+α j 	 j Industry Dummy j + εt , (5)
where DEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is sued for de-
faulting on its own loan repayment, and 0 otherwise. CURRENT is current
ratio, measured as current assets divided by current liabilities. ROA is return
on assets. INTCOV is interest coverage ratio, measured as income before in-
terest and tax expense divided by interest expense. WCAP is working capital
divided by total assets. SALES is total sales divided by total assets. OPRCYCLE
is operating cycle, measured as the sum of days in receivables and days in
inventory. AGE is the age of the firm. CFOVOL measures the volatility of
CFO over the past three years. SALESGROWTH is average growth in sales
over the past three years. LLOSS is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the
firm reports a loss in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
Our primary interest lies in α1, the coefficient on SOE . If SOEs are im-
plicitly insured by the government and face a soft budget constraint, then
we expect the coefficient on SOE to be negative. We control for com-
mon financial risk factors, operating performance/risk factors, and oper-
ating efficiency measures in equation (5). Financial risk factors include
SIZE , LEV , CURRENT , INTCOV , and AGE . Operating performance/risk
factors are ROA, WCAP , SALES, CFOVOL, SALESGROWTH, LLOSS, and
MB. OPRCYCLE is an indicator of operating efficiency. Year and Industry
dummies are included to control for period and industry effects on loan
defaults. Because loan defaults can occur at any time during a year, we lag
the right-hand side variables in equation (5) by one period to mitigate the
24 Of the 146 (81) SOE (NSOE) firm-year observations, 105 (49) report one lawsuit for
defaulting on their own loans in a year and 41 (32) report multiple lawsuits for defaulting on
their own loans in a year. The total number of lawsuits against SOEs (NSOEs) for defaulting
on their own loans is 306 (312).
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T A B L E 6
Logistic Regression of Loan Default on Chinese Firm Ownership Type After Controlling for Financial
Risk and Operating Performance
Variable (Coeff.) Pred. Sign Coeff. Estimate z-value
INTERCEPT (α0) ? 0.066 0.04
SOE (α1) − −0.371 −2.39∗∗
SIZE (α2) ? −0.226 −3.51∗∗∗
LEV (α3) ? 0.357 1.54
MB (α4) ? 0.022 1.65∗
CURRENT (α5) ? −1.082 −4.41∗∗∗
ROA (α6) ? −0.444 −1.96∗∗
INTCOV (α7) ? −0.0005 −1.08
WCAP (α8) ? 0.136 1.55
SALES (α9) ? 0.034 0.18
OPRCYCLE (α10) ? 0.347 5.53∗∗∗
AGE (α11) ? 0.275 3.10∗∗∗
CFOVOL (α12) ? 4.026 2.84∗∗∗
SALESGROWTH (α13) ? −0.248 −2.00∗∗






This table examines the relation between Chinese firm ownership type and the likelihood of default on
the firm’s own loans using the following logistic model:
DEFAULTt = α0 + α1SOEt −1 + α2SIZEt −1 + α3LEVt −1 + α4MBt −1 + α5CURRENTt −1 + α6ROAt −1
+ α7INTCOVt −1 + α8WCAPt −1 + α9SALESt −1 + α10OPRCYCLEt −1 + α11AGEt −1
+ α12CFOVOLt −1 + α13SALESGROWTHt −1 + α14LLOSSt −1 + αi	iYear Dummyi
+ αj	j Industry Dummyj + εt
The sample consists of 5,368 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006 that have sufficient data to
calculate the regression variables. The z-values are based on two-way, cluster-robust standard errors adjusting
for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. DEFAULT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
sued for defaulting on its own loan repayment, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0 otherwise. SIZE
is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-
term debt scaled by total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio. CURRENT is current ratio, measured as current
assets divided by current liabilities. ROA is return on assets. INTCOV is interest coverage ratio, measured
as income before interest and tax expense divided by interest expense. WCAP is working capital scaled by
total assets. SALES measures total sales scaled by total assets. OPRCYCLE is operating cycle, measured as the
sum of days in receivables and days in inventory. AGE is the age of the firm. CFOVOL is the volatility of CFO
over the past three years. SALESGROWTH is average growth in sales over the past three years. LLOSS is a
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reports a loss in the previous year, 0 otherwise.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
contemporaneous effect of loan defaults on various financial risk and per-
formance measures.25
Table 6 reports the results of estimating equation (5). We find that the
coefficient on SOE is significantly negative (α1 = −0.371, z = −2.39), indi-
cating that the likelihood of loan default is lower for SOEs than for NSOEs.
25 Our results are not affected if we measure all the variables in equation (5) at year t.
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Such a difference cannot be explained by differences in firm-specific finan-
cial risk and operating performance between the two types of firms. It likely
reflects the government’s implicit insurance role in reducing SOEs’ default
risk.
We have two observations related to this analysis. First, our measure of
DEFAULT captures firms that default on their loans and are sued by their
lenders. In many loan default cases, the two contracting parties will typi-
cally renegotiate contract terms before resorting to the courts. Therefore,
our results are also consistent with the explanation that the government
may intervene in the contract renegotiation process to help SOEs avoid
lawsuits, which presumably are a more costly means of dealing with loan
default. Second, our analysis excludes defaults on firms’ guaranteed loans
because the determinants of joint liability cannot be properly identified
without information about the firms whose loans are guaranteed. However,
to the extent that defaulting on guaranteed loans increases the risk of de-
faulting on a firm’s own loans, including defaults on guaranteed loans in
the measure of DEFAULT may provide additional insights. Therefore, we
reestimate equation (5) after including defaults on guaranteed loans. We
find that the coefficient on SOE is still significantly negative (untabulated).
8.2 FURTHER PARTITIONING OF SBs INTO POLICY AND COMMERCIAL SBs
As discussed in section 2, the Chinese government commercialized most
SBs and delegated the policy lending function to three policy banks. In this
section, we examine whether policy SBs and commercial SBs have differen-
tial demand for accounting conservatism. Although both are state-owned,
policy SBs base their loan granting decisions primarily on government di-
rection and public social benefits, whereas commercial SBs place a rela-
tively larger weight on economic profits and commercial principles. Hence,
commercial SBs are likely to be more concerned with the default risk of
their investments and, therefore, to demand more conservative accounting
from their clients than policy SBs. We estimate the following regression to
test this prediction:
ACCt = ζ0 + ζ1DCF Ot + ζ2CF Ot + ζ3DCF Ot × CF Ot + ζ4SOEt
+ ζ5SOEt × DCF Ot + ζ6SOEt × CF Ot + ζ7SOEt × DCF Ot
× CF Ot + ζ8SB PLCYt + ζ9SB PLCYt × DCF Ot + ζ10SB PLCYt
× CF Ot + ζ11SB PLCYt × DCF Ot × CF Ot + ζ12SB COMMt
+ ζ13SB COMMt × DCF Ot + ζ14SB COMMt × CF Ot
+ ζ15SB COMMt × DCF Ot × CF Ot + εt , (6)
where SB PLCY and SB COMM measure the percentage of loans that orig-
inate from policy SBs and commercial SBs, respectively. We expect the co-
efficients on SB PLCYt × DCFOt × CFOt (ζ 11) and SB COMMt × DCFOt
× CFOt (ζ 15) to be negative. More importantly, if policy SBs demand less
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T A B L E 7
Accounting Conservatism of Chinese Firms That Borrow from Policy State-Owned Banks (SBs) and from
Commercial State-Owned Banks (SBs)
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff.
Variable (Coeff.) Pred. Sign Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
INTERCEPT (ζ 0) ? −0.008 −0.39 −0.313 −5.34∗∗∗
DCFO (ζ 1) ? 0.078 0.99 −0.118 −0.75
CFO (ζ 2) − −0.378 −2.99∗∗∗ −1.562 −3.30∗∗∗
DCFO × CFO (ζ 3) + 1.876 1.93∗ 3.164 1.67∗
SOE (ζ 4) ? −0.0001 −0.00 −0.005 −1.54
SOE × DCFO (ζ 5) ? 0.003 0.33 −0.001 −0.15
SOE × CFO (ζ 6) ? 0.025 0.76 −0.020 −0.75
SOE × DCFO × CFO (ζ 7) − −0.300 −2.06∗∗ −0.216 −2.14∗∗
SB PLCY (ζ 8) ? 0.033 1.19 0.010 0.44
SB PLCY × DCFO (ζ 9) ? −0.127 −1.35 −0.122 −1.45
SB PLCY × CFO (ζ 10) ? −0.475 −3.05∗∗∗ −0.272 −2.60∗∗∗
SB PLCY × DCFO × CFO (ζ 11) − −2.742 −2.42∗∗ −3.161 −3.50∗∗∗
SB COMM (ζ 12) ? 0.007 0.41 −0.0005 −0.03
SB COMM × DCFO (ζ 13) ? −0.076 −1.06 −0.074 −1.19
SB COMM × CFO (ζ 14) ? −0.296 −2.80∗∗∗ −0.117 −1.34
SB COMM × DCFO × CFO (ζ 15) − −1.587 −1.73∗ −1.721 −2.04∗∗
(Continued)
conservative accounting than do commercial SBs, we should observe ζ 11 <
ζ 15.
We report the results of estimating equation (6) in the first column of ta-
ble 7. Consistent with the results shown in table 3, the coefficient on SOEt ×
DCFOt × CFOt is significantly negative, suggesting that SOEs adopt less con-
servative accounting than NSOEs (ζ 7 = −0.300, t = −2.06). We find that
both ζ 11 and ζ 15 are significantly negative, consistent with the hypothesis
that the more the firm borrows from SBs (whether policy SBs or commer-
cial SBs), the less conservative is its accounting (ζ 11 = −2.742, t = −2.42;
ζ 15 = −1.587, t = −1.73). Furthermore, ζ 11 is significantly less than ζ 15
(t = −3.53), implying that policy SBs have weaker demand for conserva-
tive accounting than commercial SBs. The second column indicates that
these results are robust to including the control variables SIZE , LEV , and
MB. We conclude that there is cross-sectional variation in the demand for
accounting conservatism among SBs, particularly between policy SBs and
commercial SBs.26
26 We assess the robustness of these results using two alternative measures of accounting
conservatism (see section 8.4). Under both measures, accounting conservatism decreases as
the fraction of loans from policy and commercial SBs increases. We continue to observe a
significant difference in accounting conservatism between firms that borrow from policy SBs
and firms that borrow from commercial SBs under Basu’s differential timeliness measure of
accounting conservatism. However, when we perform a time-series test of timeliness of loss
recognition, we do not detect such a significant difference after controlling for size, leverage,
and market-to-book.
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T A B L E 7 —Continued
Model 1 Model 2
Coeff. Coeff.
Variable (Coeff.) Pred. Sign Estimate t-value Estimate t-value
SIZE (ζ 16) ? 0.015 5.41∗∗∗
SIZE × DCFO (ζ 17) ? 0.009 1.60
SIZE × CFO (ζ 18) ? 0.047 2.35∗∗
SIZE × CFO × DCFO (ζ 19) − −0.057 −0.85
LEV (ζ 20) ? −0.0005 −0.39
LEV × DCFO (ζ 21) ? 0.0001 0.40
LEV × CFO (ζ 22) ? −0.033 −1.76∗
LEV × CFO × DCFO (ζ 23) + 0.027 1.54
MB (ζ 24) ? 0.0001 0.11
MB × DCFO (ζ 25) ? −0.0001 −0.10
MB × CFO (ζ 26) ? 0.0005 0.05
MB × CFO × DCFO (ζ 27) + 0.0009 0.09
ζ 11– ζ 15 − −1.155 −3.53∗∗ −1.440 −6.56∗∗∗
Adj. R2 0.573 0.616
This table presents estimates of accounting conservatism of Chinese firms that report loans from policy
SBs and commercial SBs from the following regression models:
Model 1: ACCt = ζ 0 + ζ 1DCFOt + ζ 2CFOt + ζ 3DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 4SOEt + ζ 5SOEt × DCFOt
+ ζ 6SOEt × CFOt + ζ 7SOEt × DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 8SB PLCYt + ζ 9SB PLCYt × DCFOt
+ ζ 10SB PLCYt × CFOt + ζ 11SB PLCYt × DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 12SB COMMt
+ ζ 13SB COMMt × DCFOt + ζ 14SB COMMt × CFOt + ζ 15SB COMMt × DCFOt
× CFOt + εt
Model 2: ACCt = ζ 0 + ζ 1DCFOt + ζ 2CFOt + ζ 3DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 4SOEt + ζ 5SOEt × DCFOt
+ ζ 6SOEt × CFOt + ζ 7SOEt × DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 8SB PLCYt + ζ 9SB PLCYt × DCFOt
+ ζ 10SB PLCYt × CFOt + ζ 11SB PLCYt × DCFOt × CFOt + ζ 12SB COMMt
+ ζ 13SB COMMt × DCFOt + ζ 14SB COMMt × CFOt + ζ 15SB COMMt × DCFOt × CFOt
+ ζ 16SIZEt + ζ 17SIZEt × DCFOt + ζ 18SIZEt × CFOt + ζ 19SIZEt × DCFOt × CFOt
+ ζ 20LEVt + ζ 21LEVt × DCFOt + ζ 22LEVt × CFOt + ζ 23LEVt × DCFOt × CFOt
+ ζ 24MBt + ζ 25MBt × DCFOt + ζ 26MBt × CFOt + ζ 27MBt × DCFOt × CFOt + εt
The sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, of which 76.9% are SOEs.
On average, loans issued by policy SBs and commercial SBs account for 1.2% and 97.3%, respectively, of
the total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the
financial statements. The t-values are based on two-way, cluster-robust standard errors adjusting for cross-
sectional and time-series dependence. ACC is accruals scaled by beginning total assets; accruals are defined
as earnings before exceptional items and extraordinary items minus cash flows from operations. CFO is
cash flows from operations scaled by beginning total assets; cash flows from operations are defined as earn-
ings before exceptional items and extraordinary items + Depreciation − (Working capital). (Working
capital) = (Current assets) − Cash − (Current liabilities) + (Current portion of long-term loans).
DCFO is 1 if CFO is negative, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0 otherwise. SB PLCY is the ratio
of total loans from policy SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which the sources of
the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SB COMM is the ratio of total loans from commercial
SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the
financial statements. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum
of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
8.3 ASSOCIATION BETWEEN BANK FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND ACCOUNTING
CONSERVATISM
Lin and Zhang [2009] find that Chinese-foreign joint equity and exclu-
sively foreign banks exhibit better long-term performance on average than
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domestic banks. Banks with foreign ownership likely have better corporate
governance and are more likely to demand high-quality, “hard” (e.g., finan-
cial) information than domestic banks. Foreign investors are profit seek-
ers and less able/willing to process “soft” (e.g., nonfinancial) information
about local firms. We expect that as firms get more loans from banks with
foreign ownership or from exclusively foreign banks, the demand for ac-
counting conservatism increases. We estimate the following regression to
examine the association between bank foreign ownership and accounting
conservatism:
ACCt = σ0 + σ1DCF Ot + σ2CF Ot + σ3DCF Ot × CF Ot + σ4SOEt
+ σ5SOEt × DCF Ot + σ6SOEt × CF Ot + σ7SOEt
× DCF Ot × CF Ot + σ8FBt + σ9FBt × DCF Ot + σ10FBt × CF Ot
+ σ11FBt × DCF Ot × CF Ot + εt , (7)
where FB is the fraction of loans from banks with foreign ownership and
from exclusively foreign banks to total loans outstanding for which the
sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. A positive co-
efficient on FBt × DCFOt × CFOt (σ 11) indicates an increase in accounting
conservatism with bank foreign ownership.
Our results (untabulated) continue to support H1 (σ 7 = −0.291, t =
−1.98). We also find that firms that borrow more from banks with foreign
ownership or from exclusively foreign banks adopt more conservative ac-
counting (σ 11 = 2.954, t = 2.11). Including the control variables SIZE ,
LEV , and MB does not change these results.27 Caution, however, should
be exercised when interpreting these results because they are also consis-
tent with an alternative explanation that the government sells the equity of
better banks to attract foreign investors, which demand more conservative
accounting regardless of foreign ownership.
8.4 ALTERNATIVE MEASURES OF ACCOUNTING CONSERVATISM
In this section, we assess the robustness of our results to two alternative
measures of accounting conservatism. Basu [1997] develops a measure of
conservatism that has been widely used in accounting research. He defines
conservatism as the tendency to require a higher degree of verification for
unrealized gains versus unrealized losses, that is, earnings reflect bad news
more quickly than good news. According to Basu’s definition, a higher sen-
sitivity of earnings to negative news than to positive news is evidence of
conservatism. We first assess whether our results are robust to the use of
27 However, the association between bank foreign ownership and accounting conservatism
is insignificant under the two alternative measures of accounting conservatism. We conjecture
that the weak evidence could be due to the low economic significance of loans from banks
with foreign ownership. Only 4% of our sample firms obtain loans from banks with foreign
ownership and their average fraction of loans from these banks is 12.4%.
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the Basu measure. Following Basu [1997], we estimate the following regres-
sion:
Et/Pt−1 = λ0 + λ1DRt + λ2Rt + λ3DRt × Rt + λ4SOEt + λ5SOEt
× DRt + λ6SOEt × Rt + λ7SOEt × DRt × Rt + λ8LSBt
+ λ9LSBt × DRt + λ10LSBt × Rt + λ11LSBt × DRt × Rt + εt , (8)
where E is earnings per share, P is price per share at the end of the year,
R is 12-month buy-and-hold annual returns from May of year t to April of
year t + 1, and DR is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is negative and 0
otherwise.
We present the results of estimating equation (8) in the first column of
table 8. The interactive slope coefficient, λ3, which measures the difference
in sensitivity of earnings to bad and good news for NSOEs, is positive and
statistically significant (λ3 = 0.256, t = 2.29), implying that earnings are
more sensitive to negative returns than to positive returns for NSOEs.
We find consistent evidence that SOEs adopt less conservative accounting
than NSOEs, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient on SOEt
× DRt × Rt (λ7 = −0.049, t = −2.96). The results also suggest that firms
adopt less conservative accounting when they borrow more from SBs. We
find a negative and statistically significant coefficient on LSBt × DRt × Rt
(λ11 = −0.181, t = −1.70). As shown in the second column of table 8, the
main inferences are not altered after controlling for the effects of SIZE ,
LEV , and MB on accounting conservatism.
Our second alternative measure of accounting conservatism examines
the time-series properties of earnings change. Specifically, it measures
timely gain and loss recognition as the tendency for increases and decreases
in earnings to reverse (Basu [1997], Ball and Shivakumar [2005]). From a
time-series perspective, conservatism implies that bad news incorporated in
current earnings will appear as a transitory shock in the earnings process.
In contrast, good news is likely to appear as a persistent shock in the earn-
ings process because the effects of good news will be spread over future
periods’ earnings. We estimate the following regression to investigate the
effect of conservatism on earnings time-series and allow it to vary between
SOEs and NSOEs as well as with the fraction of loans from SBs:
N It = ρ0 + ρ1DN It−1 + ρ2N It−1 + ρ3DN It−1 × N It−1 + ρ4SOEt
+ ρ5SOEt × DN It−1 + ρ6SOEt × N It−1 + ρ7SOEt × DN It−1
×N It−1 + ρ8LSBt + ρ9LSBt × DN It−1 + ρ10LSBt × N It−1
+ ρ11LSBt × DN It−1 × N It−1 + εt , (9)
where NI is change in earnings scaled by beginning total assets, and DNI
equals 1 if NI is negative and 0 otherwise.
In equation (9), the coefficient on DNIt−1 × NIt−1, ρ3, indicates the
effect of conservatism on earnings time-series for NSOEs. If bad news, as
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Accounting Conservatism of Chinese Firms with Different Borrower and Lender Ownership Types: Tests
Using Basu’s [1997] Differential Timeliness Measure of Accounting Conservatism
Model 1 Model 2
Variable (Coeff.) Pred. Sign Coeff. Estimate t-value Coeff. Estimate t-value
INTERCEPT (λ0) ? 0.032 2.46∗∗∗ −0.166 −1.41
DR (λ1) ? −0.024 −0.63 −0.388 −1.94∗∗
R (λ2) + −0.070 −0.84 −0.564 −2.53∗∗∗
DR × R (λ3) + 0.256 2.29∗∗ 0.954 2.86∗∗∗
SOE (λ4) ? 0.006 1.61 0.002 0.66
SOE × DR (λ5) ? 0.008 0.70 −0.001 −0.11
SOE × R (λ6) ? 0.0007 0.09 −0.013 −1.24
SOE × DR × R (λ7) − −0.049 −2.96∗∗∗ −0.028 −2.01∗∗
LSB (λ8) ? −0.017 −1.14 −0.017 −1.16
LSB × DR (λ9) ? 0.007 0.22 0.038 1.03
LSB × R (λ10) ? 0.122 1.52 0.153 1.82∗
LSB × DR × R (λ11) − −0.181 −1.70∗ −0.116 −1.87∗
SIZE (λ12) ? 0.009 1.53
SIZE × DR (λ13) ? 0.016 1.66∗
SIZE × R (λ14) ? 0.022 1.70∗
SIZE × DR × R (λ15) - −0.041 −2.77∗∗∗
LEV (λ16) ? 0.001 0.10
LEV × DR (λ17) ? −0.013 −0.72
LEV × R (λ18) ? 0.016 1.71∗
LEV × DR × R (λ19) + 0.102 5.64∗∗∗
MB (λ20) ? 0.0004 1.55
MB × DR (λ21) ? −0.0005 −1.58
MB × R (λ22) ? −0.003 −1.99∗∗
MB × DR × R (λ23) + 0.003 2.07∗∗
Adj. R2 0.082 0.153
This table presents estimates of accounting conservatism of Chinese firms with different borrower and
lender ownership types using Basu’s [1997] differential timeliness measure of accounting conservatism.
We use the following regression models:
Model 1: Et /Pt −1 = λ0 + λ1DRt + λ2Rt + λ3DRt × Rt + λ4SOEt + λ5SOEt × DRt + λ6SOEt × Rt
+ λ7SOEt × DRt × Rt + λ8LSBt + λ9LSBt × DRt + λ10LSBt × Rt + λ11LSBt × DRt
× Rt + εt
Model 2: Et /Pt −1 = λ0 + λ1DRt + λ2Rt + λ3DRt × Rt + λ4SOEt + λ5SOEt × DRt + λ6SOEt × Rt
+ λ7SOEt × DRt × Rt + λ8LSBt + λ9LSBt × DRt + λ10LSBt × Rt
+ λ11LSBt × DRt × Rt + λ12SIZEt + λ13SIZEt × DRt + λ14SIZEt × Rt + λ15SIZEt
× DRt × Rt + λ16LEVt + λ17LEVt × DRt + λ18LEVt × Rt + λ19LEVt × DRt
× Rt + λ20MBt + λ21MBt × DRt + λ22MBt × Rt + λ23MBt × DRt × Rt + εt
The sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, of which 76.9% are SOEs.
On average, 98.5% of the loans are issued by SBs in our sample. The t-values are based on two-way, cluster-
robust standard errors adjusting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. E is earnings per share. P is
price per share at the end of year. R is 12-month buy-and-hold stock returns from May of the current year to
April of the next year. DR is1 if R is negative, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE, 0 otherwise. LSB is
the ratio of total loans from SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for which the sources of the
loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SIZE is the natural logarithm of total assets. LEV is leverage
ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets. MB is market-to-book ratio.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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measured by decrease in earnings, is recognized in a timelier fashion than
good news for NSOEs, ρ3 will be less than 0. We are interested in ρ7, the
coefficient on SOEt × DNIt−1 × NIt−1, which estimates the difference in
the implications of conservatism for earnings time-series between SOEs and
NSOEs, and ρ11, the coefficient on LSBt × DNIt−1 × NIt−1, which indi-
cates the implications of lender state ownership for earnings time-series.
Positive estimates of ρ7 and ρ11 will be consistent with H1 and H2, respec-
tively.
We report the results of estimating equation (9) in the first column of
table 9. We find that SOEs recognize bad news in a less timely manner than
NSOEs (ρ7 = 0.492, t = 1.88). We do not observe a significant relation be-
tween lender state ownership and earnings time-series in the first column.
However, after we control for SIZE , LEV , and MB, we find evidence consis-
tent with H2 that there is less reversal of earnings decrease as firms borrow
more from SBs (ρ11 = 1.240, t = 1.94), reflecting a lower frequency of
timely loss recognition due to lower demand for accounting conservatism.
Overall, the results of these sensitivity tests indicate that the inferences
from our main test are robust to different measures of accounting conser-
vatism.
8.5 EVIDENCE ON CONSERVATISM FROM INDIVIDUAL ACCRUAL ACCOUNTS
Our previous analysis studies conservatism using aggregate accounting
numbers. In this section, we focus on individual accrual accounts to better
understand how firms implement conservative accounting. Documenting
evidence on conservatism by reference to individual accrual accounts can
potentially strengthen the conclusions of our primary analysis.
We present evidence on differences in the implementation of conserva-
tive accounting between SOEs and NSOEs by focusing on a large menu
of accrual accounts, including accounts receivable, short-term investments,
inventories, long-term investments, fixed assets, intangible assets, and con-
struction in progress. Given that our primary interest is in news-dependent
conservative accounting (i.e., conditional conservatism) and its effect on
the income statement, we evaluate the provisions for losses in these ac-
counts that are charged in the period when the firm experiences good and
bad news.
Table 10 reports the results of this analysis. We scale the loss provision
for each individual accrual account by the beginning balance of its cor-
responding asset account and industry adjust it by subtracting the corre-
sponding industry median. Doing so provides control for differences in
macroeconomic conditions each year that affect all firms in the industry.
Following our three aggregate measures of conservatism in the previous
analysis, we use negative (positive) CFO, negative (positive) R , and nega-
tive (positive) NI as proxies for bad (good) news. Panel A (B) reports the
mean values of the loss provisions for each account for SOEs and NSOEs
when they experience bad (good) news. We find that NSOEs charge more
loss provisions for accounts receivable and fixed assets than SOEs when they
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Accounting Conservatism of Chinese Firms with Different Borrower and Lender Ownership Types:
Time-Series Tests of Timeliness of Loss Recognition
Model 1 Model 2
Pred.
Variable (Coeff.) Sign Coeff. Estimate t-value Coeff. Estimate t-value
INTERCEPT (ρ0) ? 0.008 0.37 −0.065 −1.38
DNIt −1 (ρ1) ? −0.041 −1.08 −0.182 −2.79∗∗∗
NIt −1 (ρ2) ? 0.009 0.01 −1.096 −2.92∗∗∗
DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ3) − −0.557 −0.41 −3.697 −6.42∗∗∗
SOE (ρ4) ? 0.013 2.19∗∗ 0.002 0.40
SOE × DNIt −1 (ρ5) ? 0.003 0.65 0.013 5.36∗∗∗
SOE × NIt −1 (ρ6) ? −0.360 −1.66∗ −0.088 −2.05∗∗
SOE × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ7) + 0.492 1.88∗ 0.200 2.09∗∗
LSB (ρ8) ? −0.016 −0.67 0.006 0.80
LSB × DNIt −1 (ρ9) ? 0.009 0.21 0.018 0.90
LSB × NIt −1 (ρ10) ? 0.230 0.18 −0.844 −8.81∗∗∗
LSB × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ11) + −0.697 −0.45 1.240 1.94∗
SIZE (ρ12) ? 0.003 1.11
SIZE × DNIt −1 (ρ13) ? 0.006 2.08∗∗
SIZE × NIt −1 (ρ14) ? 0.092 5.20∗∗∗
SIZE × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ15) + 0.068 7.79∗∗∗
LEV (ρ16) ? −0.008 −1.44
LEV × DNIt −1 (ρ17) ? 0.011 1.77∗
LEV × NIt −1 (ρ18) ? 0.13 4.90∗∗∗
LEV × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ19) − 0.076 1.21
MB (ρ20) ? 0.0002 0.75
MB × DNIt −1 (ρ21) ? −0.0004 −0.71
MB × NIt −1 (ρ22) ? 0.0006 1.27
MB × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 (ρ23) − −0.001 −0.41
Adj. R2 0.564 0.679
This table presents estimates of accounting conservatism of Chinese firms with different borrower and
lender ownership types using time-series estimates of timeliness of loss recognition. We use the following
regression models:
Model 1: NIt = ρ0 + ρ1DNIt−1 + ρ2NIt−1 + ρ3DNIt−1 × NIt−1 + ρ4SOEt + ρ5SOEt × DNIt−1
+ ρ6SOEt × NIt−1 + ρ7SOEt × DNIt−1 × NIt−1 + ρ8LSBt + ρ9LSBt × DNIt−1
+ ρ10LSBt × NIt−1 + ρ11LSBt × DNIt−1 × NIt−1 + εt
Model 2: NIt = ρ0 + ρ1DNIt−1 + ρ2NIt−1 + ρ3DNIt−1 × NIt−1 + ρ4SOEt + ρ5SOEt × DNIt −1
+ ρ6SOEt × NIt−1 + ρ7SOEt × DNIt−1 × NIt−1 + ρ8LSBt + ρ9LSBt × DNIt −1
+ ρ10LSBt × NIt−1 + ρ11LSBt × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 + ρ12SIZEt + ρ13SIZEt
× DNIt −1 + ρ14SIZEt × NIt −1 + ρ15SIZEt × DNIt −1 × NIt −1 + ρ16LEVt
+ ρ17LEVt × DNIt −1 + ρ18LEVt × NIt −1 + ρ19LEVt × DNIt −1 × NIt −1
+ ρ20MBt + ρ21MBt × DNIt −1 + ρ22MBt × NIt −1 + ρ23MBt × DNIt −1
× NIt −1 + εt
The sample consists of 5,433 firm-year observations between 2001 and 2006, of which 76.9% are SOEs.
On average, 98.5% of the loans are issued by SBs in our sample. The t-values are based on two-way, cluster-
robust standard errors adjusting for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. NI is change in earnings
scaled by beginning total assets. DNI is 1 if NI is negative, 0 otherwise. SOE is 1 if the firm is an SOE,
0 otherwise. LSB is the ratio of total loans from SBs to total loans outstanding at the end of the year for
which the sources of the loans are disclosed in the financial statements. SIZE is the natural logarithm of
total assets. LEV is leverage ratio, defined as the sum of long-term and short-term debt scaled by total assets.
MB is market-to-book ratio.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively, in a two-tailed test.
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report negative CFO. When firms experience negative R , NSOEs on average
charge more loss provisions for accounts receivable, fixed assets, intangible
assets, and construction in process than SOEs do. Using negative NI as
a proxy for bad news, we again find that NSOEs on average report more
conservatively on loss provisions for accounts receivable, fixed assets, and
intangible assets. Across all three proxies for bad news, NSOEs report sig-
nificantly greater total loss provisions for these accounts. In contrast, when
firms experience good news, we detect little significant difference in loss
provisions for these individual accrual accounts between SOEs and NSOEs.
These results suggest that, at the individual level of these accrual accounts,
SOEs accrue unrealized losses in bad-news years in a less timely manner
than NSOEs, but not in good-news years.
Although the list of accounts reflecting (conditional) conservative esti-
mates is not exhaustive, these results provide some direct evidence on the
specific types of accruals underlying the more conservative accounting ex-
hibited by NSOEs.
9. Conclusion
Our study examines the association between borrower and lender state
ownership and accounting conservatism for a large sample of Chinese firms
from 2001 to 2006. Given that both parties to the debt contract have signifi-
cant cross-sectional differences in incentives for financial reporting conser-
vatism, we are able to devise sharper and more powerful tests to investigate
the determinants of the demand for conservatism.
We find that SOEs, on average, adopt less conservative accounting than
NSOEs. After controlling for borrower state ownership, lender state owner-
ship plays an incremental and significant role in shaping accounting con-
servatism. Empirical evidence suggests that firms adopt less conservative
accounting as they borrow more from SBs. Our results also imply that pol-
icy SBs have weaker demand for accounting conservatism than commercial
SBs and domestic banks have weaker demand for accounting conservatism
than banks with foreign ownership or exclusively foreign banks, although
these results are to some degree sensitive to the measures of accounting
conservatism.
We caution against drawing any conclusions of a causal relation between
state ownership and accounting conservatism based on the results of our
tests. Although we have ruled out several alternative explanations for our
findings and controlled for various firm characteristics that are predicted
to impact the demand for conservatism, we note that other unobservable
systematic differences could potentially explain the observed difference in
accounting conservatism between SOEs and NSOEs (e.g., conflicts between
banks and shareholders). Given the likely endogenous nature of the set-
ting and the possible alternative explanations, our study should be viewed
only as documenting a significant association between state ownership and
accounting conservatism in a debt contracting setting. Potential avenues
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for future research include examining changes over time in borrowers’ ac-
counting conservatism in response to major SBs’ ownership reform (e.g.,
changes in their listing status) and assessing the cost-benefit tradeoff that
Chinese firms face when they choose their conservatism level.
APPENDIX
Examples of Accounting-Based Debt Covenants
Lender: China Construction Bank (SB—Big Four)
SOE borrower
1) The borrower must maintain a minimum credit rating of AA. If a
downgrade becomes necessary, the bank will immediately freeze the
remaining credit line.
2) Debt-to-assets ratio must not exceed 70%. Total bank loans must not
exceed 80% of total debt. Operating cash flows must be positive. Net
asset must not decline. If the borrower fails to meet any of the above
conditions, the bank will immediately reduce or freeze the remaining
credit line until the conditions are all met again.
3) If the borrower’s contingent liability-to-net asset ratio exceeds 60%,
the bank will immediately reduce or freeze the remaining credit line
until the contingent liability-to-net asset ratio falls below 60% again.
SOE borrower
Conditions of sustainable use of the credit line:
1) The borrower must maintain a minimum credit rating of AA and the
debt-to-assets ratio must not exceed 60%.
2) The sum of the borrower’s own loans and its guaranteed loans must
not exceed the net assets. The borrower’s credit standards of other
loans must be at least as high as the credit standards of this loan.
NSOE borrower
1) During the loan period, the company must maintain a minimum
credit rating of A−. If a downgrade becomes necessary, the bank will
immediately freeze the remaining credit line.
2) Debt-to-assets ratio must not exceed 65%. Current ratio must be at
least 3. If the borrower fails to meet either condition, the bank will
immediately reduce or freeze the remaining credit line.
NSOE borrower
1) During the life of the loan, debt-to-equity ratio must not exceed 1.8
and debt-to-assets ratio must not exceed 65%.
2) If the borrower has negative operating cash flows in three consecutive
years, the bank will immediately freeze the credit line. The borrower
must provide additional collaterals.
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Lender: China Merchants Bank (SB—National Joint Stock)
NSOE borrower
1) The borrower must maintain a minimum credit rating of AA− and
debt-to-assets ratio must not exceed 60%. If either condition is not
met, the bank will immediately freeze the remaining credit line.
2) The sum of the borrower’s own loans and its guaranteed loans must
not exceed the net assets.
3) The borrower’s credit standards of other loans must be at least as high
as the credit standards of this loan.
Lender: China Minsheng Bank (NSB)
SOE borrower
At the end of each year during the life of the loan, the borrower must
provide financial statements for the past three years. The bank will review
its financial conditions including, but not limited to, operating income,
profit margin, operating cash flows, and debt-to-assets ratio. If any of the
above performance measures deteriorates (relative to the financial perfor-
mance when the loan is granted), the bank will reassess the loan and adjust
the credit line.
Lender: Xiamen International Bank (Bank with Foreign Ownership)
SOE borrower
During the life of the loan, the borrower must meet the following financial
conditions: debt-to-assets ratio less than or equal to 70%; positive net in-
come; quick ratio greater than or equal to 0.5; operating cash flows (net)
greater than or equal to RMB 300,000,000; and interest coverage ratio
greater than 2. If the borrower fails to meet any of the above conditions,
the bank will immediately reduce or freeze the credit line.
SOE borrower
During the life of the loan, if the borrower’s credit rating, profit margin,
debt-to-assets ratio, or operating cash flows significantly deteriorates rela-
tive to the performance when the loan is approved, which adversely im-
pacts the safety of the loan, the bank will immediately reduce or freeze the
credit line.
NSOE borrower
During the life of the loan, the borrower must meet the following financial
conditions: sales revenues greater than RMB 100,000,000; gross margin
greater than 15%; net profit margin greater than 8%; quick ratio greater
than 1; and positive operating cash flows. If the borrower fails to meet any
of the above conditions, the bank will immediately reduce or freeze the
credit line.
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NSOE borrower
The borrower must deposit all of its ticket sales in the loan account opened
in our bank. The bank requires that sales deposited in this account be
greater than or equal to RMB 30,000,000 during July to December in
20WW; RMB 25,000,000 during January to July in 20XX; RMB 35,000,000
during July to December in 20YY; and RMB 30,000,000 from January in
20ZZ to the loan maturity date. The bank will charge a 0.5% fee on the
shortfall if the borrower’s ticket sales does not reach the target. The bank
may require the borrower to repay the loan immediately.
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